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Abstract
A collective choice problem - essentially a bargaining problem with-
out disagreement outcome - is studied. An exteneded solution, which
determines simultaneously a solution and a reference point, is char-
acterized through a system of axioms. It is proved that the unique
extended solution meeting Pareto-optimality, independence of irrele-
vant alternatives, symmetry, and scale invariance axioms maximizes
the Nash product via both the solution and the reference point.
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1 Introduction
We study collective choice situation where two players need to choose from
the set of joint actions. We assume that only the induced utilities aﬀect the
choice, and hence concentrate on the utility representation of the problem.
The utility possibility set, which we assume to be compact and convex set in
R2, is the only primitive of our model. Thus the central diﬀerence between
our model and the bargaining problem á la Nash (1950) is that we do not
assume the existence of an exogenously given disagreement outcome.
In many scenarios, a disagreement outcome can be determined on natural
grounds. In such cases bargaining theory provides the natural framework
to analyse collective decision making. However, in other scenarios neither
∗I am grateful to an associate editor and a referee, whose constructive criticism im-
proved the paper significantly. I also thank Klaus Kultti and Hannu Salonen for benefical
comments, and Ehud Kalai for guidance at the early stages of the project.
†Ludviginkatu 3, FIN-00130 Helsinki. E-mail: hannu.vartiainen@yjs.fi.
1
the existence nor placing of the disagreement outcome is clear at the outset,
and they need to be assumed on ad hoc grounds. A theory which does not
rely on exogenous disagreement outcome, or which generates a disagreement
outcome endogenously, would be highly helpful in such situations. Coming
up with such theory is the aim of this paper.1
We departure from the standard bargaining framework by how we model
the solution. Collective choice is analyzed through an extended solution F
that consists of pairs of utility vectors and may, a priori, have multiple
values. Specifically, under collective choice problem U, extended solution
F (U) is a nonempty convex set in U × U. Thus an element of the extended
solution F (U), say (s, r), is an ordered pair of utility vectors. The first entry,
”s”, of such ordered pair is called as a solution and the second entry, ”r”,
as a reference outcome.
Heuristically, the role of a reference outcome is to motivate the solu-
tion through the standard counterfactual argument: Solution s constitutes
an acceptable compromise given that in the absence of cooperation players
would end up choosing r.2 Of course, the question is not only how to choose
a solution given the reference outcome, but also how to choose a reference
outcome given the solution it induces. A priori, the two selection problems
seem redundant. Since we are primarily interested in the solution, why not
simply disregard the reference outcome altogether from the definition of the
problem, and focus solely on the solution? The point is that a reference
outcome allows a point from which utility comparisons can be made. Thus
with a reference outcome the problem of choosing the solution as a function
of preferences can be translated into one of choosing the solution on the
basis of utility comparisons. As pointed out by Conley at. al. (1997, forth.)
and Thomson (1981), this diﬀerence is crucial. It allows one to circumvent
the impossibility problems familiar in the social choice literature. This issue
is further discussed in the final section of the paper.
In practice, the key problem with a bargaining problem without a refer-
ence point is that the standard axiomatizations are not powerful enough to
pin down a well defined solution.3 The point of this paper is to show that
this problem can be circumvented simply by assuming that the choices of
both the solution and the reference point are governed by the same princi-
1Roth (1977), Thomson (1981), and Conley at.al (1997, forth.) replace a fixed disagree-
ment point by a reference function that map each utility possibility set to a point (not
necessarily in the utility possibility set) in R2. To induce a well specified solution, such
function needs to satisfy certain conditions. However, many functions meet these condi-
tions and, in general, many classes of solutuons may be indiuced. There is no immediate
rationale to rank one reference function over another.
2This interpretation is attractive especially if U is induced by correlated equilibria of
a noncooperative game.
3Conley at.al. (2000) (see also Sen, 1970, and Myerson, 1978) show that no social
choice rule satisfies the natural counterparts of the axioms that characterize the standard
bargaining solutions.
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ples. Simultaneous choice of the solution and the reference point provides
enough discipline to carry out the analysis in the standard fashion.
The axioms we impose on the extended solution are directly analogous
to those by Nash (1950). As there is no fixed disagreement point, and
the extended solution may be multivalued, the axioms must be adjusted
accordingly. Let U and V be choice problems.
• Pareto-optimality: s is Pareto-optimal for all elements (s, r) of F (U).
• Symmetry: if U is a symmetric problem, then F (U) contains a player-
wisely symmetric element.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): if U is contained by V,
and (s, r) is contained by F (V ) and U ×U, then (s, r) is contained by
F (U).
• Scale Invariance: F is invariant to utility scales.
The rationale for Pareto-optimality, scale invariance, and symmetry ax-
ioms (that we call the ”extended axioms”) are analogous to those discussed
by Nash (1950). The IIA axiom is slightly more demanding since now the
consistency principle behind IIA implicitly assumes that the reference point
selection process is governed by some kind of optimality considerations, too.
Our Main Theorem is stated as follows: In the domain of compact
and convex utility possibility sets, extended solution F satisfies Pareto-
optimality, symmetry, IIA and scale invariance axioms if and only if F = F ∗,
where
F ∗(U) = arg max
u,v∈U
(u1 − v1)(u2 − v2), for any problem U.
Solution F ∗ is called as the extended Nash solution. Note that F ∗ is single
valued whenever U is strictly convex.
The key feature of the extended Nash solution is that it does not require
the existence of a predefined disagreement point. To the contrary, the refer-
ence point is determined endogenously by the property that (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U)
if and only if s is the standard Nash solution of bargaining problem (U, r),
and −r is the standard Nash solution of bargaining problem (−U,−s). Thus
(s, r) ∈ F (U) and (−r,−s) ∈ F (−U) constitute one another’s ”dual” solu-
tions.
As usual, suﬃciency is easy. The proof of the necessary part is based on
three key insights, which we now sketch. First, due to the above described
”duality” property of (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U), points s and r lie in the boundary of
U, and the slope of the tangents of the boundary that contain these points
is in both cases equal to (s2 − r2)(s1 − r1)−1. One should note that only
the elements of F ∗(U) have this property. Now take any (s0r0) ∈ F (U).
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Assuming that r0 lies in the boundary we can proceed along the standard
avenue (symmetric rectangle that touches scaled U at (1, 1) and (−1,−1))
to prove that (s, r) ∈ F (U) for any F meeting the four axioms.
The remaining problem is then to show that r0 must lie in the boundary.
To prove this, we first show that in the domain of strictly convex and smooth
problems, when F ∗ is single valued, this indeed is the case. The reason for
this is that if r0 were not in the boundary (recall that s0 lies in the Pareto
frontier), then there is a large degree of freedom to scale U in a way the
the scaled version of U contains (s0, r0) and is still contained by U. By IIA,
the extended solutions of each scaled utility set induces the same extended
solution. But this is in contradiction with the scale invariance axiom. Thus
r0 has to lie in the boundary. This in turn implies that in the domain of
strictly convex and smooth problems F meets the axioms if and only if it is
equivalent to F ∗.
Finally, to prove the result in the general domain, note that for any
symmetric and convex problem U there is symmetric, smooth and strictly
convex problem E (e.g. a 45◦-inclined ellipse) that is contained by U and
has the property that F ∗(E) ∈ U. As the previous paragraph implies, strict
convexity and smoothness of E imply that F (E) coincides F ∗(E). But this
means that F (U) has to be equal to F ∗(U) since otherwise IIA would imply
that F (E) contains another element, too. Thus F is equivalent to F ∗ also
in the unrestricted domain.
A Generalized Framework However, the formulation of the ex-
tended solution leaves open some intepretational problems. Why is it that
the selected outcome is dependent on a reference outcome anyway? And
why is it that it dependent on only a single reference outcome rather than
a set of reference points? To answer these questions, consider the following
story on how players negotiate.
At the outset, choice problem would be solved if players would be able
to form a collective preference ordering on U : the top ranked element in
the ordering would constitute the optimal choice. Thus the problem is of
agreeing on collective preferences. The key to solve this problem is to note
that reducing the set of alternatives must make it less diﬃcult to come up
with collective preferences. Thus to reduce the diﬃculty of forming collective
preferences, we may assume that players bargain by eliminating outcomes
that are known to be collectively preferred by some other alternative. The
elimination process is continued until a set of alternatives, say G ⊆ U, is
reached on which a collective preference ordering, say Â, can be defined.
The collective choice s is now defined by the property s := maxÂG.4
To relate this story to the extended solution F , one let each element
(s, r) ∈ F (U) define a binary reference set G = {s, r} and preference or-
4Existence of such point is assumed.
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dering s Â r. Thus F could reflect the endogenous collective choice process
as described above. However, nothing in the framework forces one to con-
centrate only on this family of reference sets. An interesting result is that
under appropriate axiomatic constraints this indeed is the case.
To prove this claim, define a generalized solution G that contains, under
each U, a family of triples (s,G,Â), whose elements are as described in the
story above. Next define the ”generalized” versions of the above axioms on
solution G. The most notable changes in the axioms are related to symmetry
and IIA: Solution G meets the generalized symmetry axiom if G(U) contains
a symmetric element (s,G,Â) such that G is symmetric and (u1, u2) Â
(v1, v2) implies (u2, u1) Â (v2, v1), for all u, v ∈ G, whenever U is symmetric.
Solution G meets the generalized IIA if U ⊆ V , (s,G,Â) ∈ G(V ), and G∩U
contains at least two elements of which one is s, imply (s,G ∩ U,Â) ∈ G(U).
The result is that there is a unique generalized solution G∗ that meets the
generalized Pareto-optimality, symmetry, IIA, and scale invariance axioms.
Such G∗ is defined by the property
G∗(U) := {(s, {s, r},Â) : (s, r) ∈ F (U)∩ Â}, for all U ∈ U .
After noting that in a symmetric problem U the reference set lies in
the diagonal, the proof of this theorem is almost complete restatement of
the proof of the Main Theorem. Thus F ∗ can be seen as the reduced form
expression of a the only reasonable generalized solution G∗. This provides
further motivation for the extended Nash solution.
Outline We begin with specifying the model and the axioms. Then
we characterize the extended Nash solution and establish the results, first
in the general domain with restricted reference point, and then in the re-
stricted domain with unrestricted reference point. Finally we combine the
arguments, and prove the Main Theorem. After this, we analyse the gener-
alized solution and establish the characterization. The final section discusses
related literature and provides some remarks.
2 The Model
Let
U = {U ⊂ R2 : U compact and convex, and has nonempty interior}
be the domain of utility possibility sets U . Mapping F : U → R2 × R2 is
an extended solution correspondence if F (U) is convex5, F (U) ⊂ U ×U and
(u, u) 6∈ F (U),6 for all u ∈ U ∈ U . For any ordered pair (s, r) ∈ F (U),
5 (u, v), (u0, v0) ∈ F (U) implies (uλ+u0(1+λ), vλ+ v0(1+λ)) ∈ F (U) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
6This restriction is possible since U is not singleton by assumption. I thank the asso-
ciate editor for pointing this out.
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the first entry, s, is called as the solution and the second entry, r, as the
reference point . The role of the reference point is to serve as a basis for the
standard counterfactual argument: Solution s is collectively chosen since
otherwise players would collectively choose r, and s is collectively preferred
over r. The central question is how what is the right form of the extended
solution.
The axioms we are interested the extended solution correspondence to
satisfy are familiar from bargaining theory. They are directly analogous to
those imposed by Nash (1951).
Use the notation aU + b = {(a1u1 + b1, a2u2 + b2) : (u1, u2) ∈ U,
(a1, a2), (b1, b2) ∈ R2}. When both coordinates of u are multiplied by scalar
λ, we write λu. In particular, write −1U = −U.
EINV (Extended Scale Invariance) F (aU+b) = aF (U)+b, for a ∈ R2++, b ∈
R2, for all U ∈ U .
EIIA (Extended Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) (s, r) ∈ F (V ) ∩
U × U and U ⊆ V implies (s, r) ∈ F (U), for all U, V ∈ U .
Motivation for the independence condition is analogous to the original
one: If a particular utility comparison standard is ”collectively optimal” in
a larger utility domain, given the solution it induces, then, if the standard is
feasible also in a smaller domain, it should also be optimal in this domain.
Denote the transpose of utility possibility set U by U 0 := {(u2, u1) ∈ R2 :
(u1, u2) ∈ U}. U is symmetric if U = U 0.
ESYM (Extended Symmetry) U = U 0 implies (s1, r1) = (s2, r2) for some
(s, r) ∈ F (U).
Due to its potential multi-valuedness, F (U) need not be symmetric when
U is symmetric - F (U) only needs to a symmetric element. If F (U) is single
valued, then it is symmetric when U is symmetric.
Denote the Pareto frontier by P (U) = {u ∈ U : v ≥ u implies v /∈ U}.7
PAR (Pareto-optimality) s ∈ P (U), for all U ∈ U , for all (s, r) ∈ F (U).
Note that Pareto-optimality implies that if U is strictly convex, then
{s : (s, r) ∈ F (U)} is single valued.
2.1 The Extended Nash
Let the extended Nash solution correspondence F ∗ : U → U × U be defined
by the following property:
F ∗(U) = argmax
(u,v)∈U×U
(u1 − v1)(u2 − v2). (1)
7Vector inequalities: for u, v ∈ R2, u = v means u− v ∈ R2+; u ≥ v means u = v 6= u;
u > v means u− v ∈ R2++.
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The diﬀerence between the extended Nash solution and the standard Nash
solution (to be discussed in more precise terms below) under U is that the
latter is defined with respect to an exogenously determined reference point r.
In contrast, F ∗ allows r to be determined endogenously, and simultaneously
with s.8
The geometry of F ∗(U) will play influential role in the analysis. As the
following parity manifests, s and r, for (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U) have the interpretation
of being one anothers’ ”dual” solutions:
(s, r) ∈ F ∗(U) if and only if (−r,−s) ∈ F ∗(−U). (2)
To see the geometry of F ∗(U), choose scales of U such that (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U)∩
(−U). Applying (2) twicely, we have (−s,−r) ∈ F ∗(U). Thus S∗ := {s :
(s, r) ∈ F ∗(U)} and D∗ := {r : (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U)} constitute line segments
of equal length and slope in the boundary of U, at the opposite sides of
the origin. Thus the co{S∗,D∗} is a parallelogram whose diagonals run
through the origin. This means that F ∗(U) is single valued whenever the
boundary of U does not have flat parts - i.e. when U is strictly convex.
It also follows that the boundary has at points s and r tangent with slope
(s2 − r2)(s1 − r1)−1.
For future reference, identify function (s∗, r∗) : U → U × U such that
(s∗, r∗)(U) ∈ F ∗(U) for all U. Whenever F ∗(U) is single valued, F ∗(U) =
{(s∗, r∗)(U)}.
We next show that if the one imposes the extra condition on the ex-
tended solution F that the induced reference point always lies in the bound-
ary of the utility possibility set, then F meets the standard axioms only if
it coincides with F ∗. The necessity part of the proof runs along the stan-
dard avenue. Take any (s∗, r∗) ∈ F ∗(T ) and normalize the situation such
that s∗ = −d∗ = (1, 1) =: 1. Identify the smallest symmetric rectangle V
that contains U. Then, by EIIA, (1,−1) ∈ F (U). The crucial point is that
only at (s∗, r∗) one can find a symmetric rectangle whose sides parallel the
tangents of U at both s and r. Thus the theorem uses Nash’s key argument
to determine s∗ and r∗ simultaneously.
[Figure 1]
8As pointed out by the referee, a drawback of the extended Nash solution is that it
is not continuous (in the Hausdorﬀ metric) in the general domain of problems. As we
shall see, the same is true for any extended solution meeting the four axioms. This is
due to not anchoring the solution via fixed disagreement point. However, various domain
restrictions, e.g. strict convexity, would remove the problem.
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Lemma 1 Suppose extended solution F has the property that r ∈ U¯ for all
U ∈ U and for all (s, r) ∈ F. Then it satisfies PAR, EINV, EIIA, and ESYM
if and only if F = F ∗.
Proof. Checking PAR, EINV, ESYM, and EIIA is routine.
We show that if (s, r) satisfies PAR, EINV, ESYM, and EIIA then
F ∗(T ) = F (T ), for all T ∈ U . First we argue that F ∗(T ) ⊂ F (T ).
Step 1: Take any (s∗, r∗) ∈ F ∗(T ). Construct U = aT + b such that
ai :=
2
s∗i − r∗i
, bi := −
s∗i + r
∗
i
s∗i − r∗i
, for i = 1, 2.
Then,
a(s∗, r∗) + b = (1,−1),
for 1 := (1, 1). By EINV, (s∗, r∗) ∈ F (T ) if and only if a(s∗, r∗)+ b ∈ F (U).
Step 2: Identify rectangle V such that V = V 0, {1,−1} ⊂ V¯ , and U ⊂ V
(see Fig. 1). By convexity of U, such V exists.
Step 3: By ESYM, PAR, and property r ∈ V¯ for all (s, r) ∈ F, (1,−1) ∈
F (V ). Since U ⊆ V and (1,−1) ∈ U, it follows by EIIA that (1,−1) ∈ F (U).
Thus a(s∗, r∗) + b ∈ F (U) and, a fortiori, (s∗, r∗) ∈ F (T ).
Finally, F (T ) ⊂ F ∗(T ) follows from F ∗(T ) ⊂ F (T ) and convexity of F.
Given Lemma 1, we only need to show that any admissible F only in-
duces reference points in the boundary of the utility possibility sets. To
prove this, we first focus on a restricted domain.
Strictly Convex Problems Boundary of U is smooth if it is at least
tricely continuously diﬀerentiable. Define subdomain eU of U as follows:
eU = {U ∈ U : U is strictly convex and has smooth boundary}.
Note that the curvature of smooth U¯ is also a continuous variable.
As discussed above, the only case where (s∗, r∗) is not uniquely defined
is when U has parallel flat sides. Under eU , this is not possible and hence
F ∗ = {(s∗, r∗)}. The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma
1.
Corollary 2 Suppose extended solution F has the property that r ∈ U¯ for
all U ∈ eU and for all (s, r) ∈ F. Then it satisfies PAR, EINV, ESYM, and
EIIA on eU if and only if F = {(s∗, r∗)}.
The only complication is due to the nonexistence of the rectangular prob-
lem used in the proof of Lemma 1 in the domain under consideration. To
verify the result one needs to come up with a symmetric problem in eU that
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serves in the role of the rectangular problem: it must contain U ∈ eU (such
that F ∗(U) = {(1,−1)}) and its boundary must contain points 1 and −1.
There are many alternatives for such choice. However, it is beneficial to be
explicit. Introduce a family of 45◦-inclined ellipses:
Eh :=
(
u ∈ R2 : (u1 − u2)
2
h2
+
(u1 + u2)2
(2
√
2)2
≤
√
2
)
.
Eh is an origin-centered ellipse and parametrized by the negative (with slope
−1) diameter length h. The positive (with slope 1) diameter length of Eh is
always 2
√
2. Hence the boundary of Eh contains points 1 and −1. Any Eh
is symmetric, strictly convex and smooth. Since U is strictly convex, there
are big enough h0 and small enough h00 such that Eh00 ⊂ U ⊂ Eh0 (see Fig.
2).
[Figure 2]
Our next aim is to show that under domain eU , restriction r ∈ U¯ for
all U ∈ U for all (s, r) ∈ F is redundant - it is implied by the other four
conditions. Thus PAR, EINV, ESYM, and EIIA completely characterize the
extended Nash solution under eU . This result is established in Theorem 5.
Before proving the theorem, we need some intermediate arguments. Take
U ∈ eU . For any r ∈ U, identify the corresponding (standard) Nash solution
s∗(·, r) : eU → R2:
s∗(U, r) := argmax
u∈U
(u1 − r1)(u2 − r2).
Disagreement point r is fixed. Note that any r induces a unique (single
valued) Nash solution, and that r’s inducing a particular solution lie in the
same upward sloping line segment that also contains the solution. Since a
straight line crosses the boundary of a strictly convex set at most two times,
two distinct disagreement points in the boundary cannot induce the same
solution. This fact is established formally in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 If r, q ∈ U¯ and s∗(U, r) = s∗(U, q), then r = q.
Fix U ∈ eU . Take any q ∈ U, and identify coeﬃcients (a(q, r), b(q, r)) ∈
R2+ ×R2 such that
ai(q, r) :=
ri − s∗i (U, r)
qi − s∗i (U, q)
, bi(q, r) :=
s∗i (U, r)qi − s∗i (U, q)ri
qi − s∗i (U, q)
, for all i = 1, 2.
(3)
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Then a(q, r)s∗(U, q) + b(q, r) = s∗(U, r) and a(q, r)q + b(q, r) = r. Identify
subset Q(r) of U such that
Q(r) := {q ∈ U : a(q, r)U + b(q, r) ⊂ U} . (4)
Thus Q(r) contains such q of U that if U is normalized so that q and the
Nash solution induced by q coincide with r and the Nash solution induced
by r, then the scaled version of U is still contained in U. Note that r ∈ Q(r).
We now argue that Q(r) ∩ U¯ is single valued only if r ∈ U¯ . Identify
r¯ ∈ U¯ that induces same Nash solution than r does, and suppose that r¯ 6= r.
Normalize U such that scaled r¯ coincides with original r, and such that
the scaled r¯−induced Nash solution coincides with the original one. Call
the normalized U by U∗. Since r is not at the boundary, U∗ is a ”small-
scaled” version of U, and U∗ ⊂ U. Thus U∗ can potentially be ”shaked”
slightly such that the Nash solution of the shaked problem coincides with
the original solution, e.g. by replacing in the beginning r¯ with some qk ∈ U¯
close to it, without crossing the exterior surface of U. Lemma 4 proves that
this indeed can be done (see Figure 3a).
The result relies on the fact that the curvature of the boundary of the
small-scaled solution is higher than the original problem. Smoothness of the
boundary guarantees that there is a neighborhood around the Nash solution
where the boundary of the shaked small-scaled version of U does not cross
the boundary of U .
Proof of Lemma 4 actually shows that any reference point qk in some
neighborhood of r¯ induces a normalization of U, say Uk, that is contained
in U . Thus Q(r) contains all the elements in this neighborhood. Potential
Q(r) is depicted in Figure 3b. Note that the r−induced Nash solution under
Uk is not the normalized r¯−induced Nash solution of U .
[Figures 3a and 3b]
Lemma 4 Take U and r 6∈ U¯ . Let Q(r) be defined as in (4). Then Q(r)∩ U¯
contains at least two distinct element.
Proof. Identify r¯ ∈ U¯ such that s∗(U, r¯) = s∗(U, r). By construction,
r¯ ∈ Q(r). Take any sequence {qk} ⊂ U¯ converging to r¯ such that r¯ 6∈ {qk}.
Then, by (3),
ai(qk, r)→ ai(r¯, r) and bi(qk, r)→ bi(r¯, r), as k →∞, for i = 1, 2. (5)
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Define Uk := a(qk, r)U+b(qk, r) for all k = 1, ..., and U∗ := a(r¯, r)U+b(r¯, r).
By (5), {Uk} converges (in the Hausdorﬀ metric) to U∗. By construction,
s∗(Uk, qk) = s∗(U∗, r) for all k. Denote by P,P ∗ and P k the Pareto frontiers
of U,U∗ and Uk, respectively.
Without loss of generality, assume normalization s∗(U, r) = 0. Then
ai(r¯, r) = ri/r¯i := ρ < 1 and bi(r¯, r) = 0 for all i = 1, 2. Thus
U∗ = ρU. (6)
Since U is strictly convex, U∗ ⊂ U and U¯ ∩ U¯∗ = {0}. By convergence of
{Uk}, there is k(u) ∈ N such that u 6∈ intUk for all k > k(u) for any u ∈ U¯ .
If supu∈U¯ k(u) ≤ k∗, then qk
∗ ∈ Q(r).
We aim at showing that supu∈U¯ k(u) is finite. Take any open neighbor-
hood B around 0. Since {Uk} converges to U∗, set {k(u) : u ∈ U¯ \ B}
is necessarily finite. It thus suﬃces to show that there is neighborhood B
around 0 such that sup{k(u) : u ∈ U¯∩B} is finite, or that B∩U¯∩U¯k0 = {0}
for all k0 > k, for some k.
Describe the Pareto frontiers of U,U∗ and Uk by functions β : {u1 :
u ∈ P} → {u2 : u ∈ P}, β∗ : {u1 : u ∈ P ∗} → {u2 : u ∈ P ∗} and
βk : {u1 : u ∈ P k} → {u2 : u ∈ P k}, respectively. Since U is smooth, β00 is
continuous. Now, by normalization (6),
β00k(0) =
a2(qk, r)
a1(qk, r)
β00∗
µ
b1(qk, r)
a1(qk, r)
¶
→ β00∗(0), as k →∞, (7)
where the first equality is by definition, and the second by (5). On the other
hand, by (6),
β00∗(0) = ρ
−1β00(0).
Since U is strictly convex and smooth,
β00(0) < 0.
Thus, by (7) and ρ < 1, there is k such that
β00k(0) < β
00(0), for all k0 ≥ k.
Let ∆(x) := βk(x) − β(x). Assume x > 0. Since βk(0) = β(0)(= 0) and
β0k(0) = β
0(0)(= r2/r1), Taylor expansion at 0 yields
∆(x) =
x
2
h
∆00(x) +
x
3
∆000(x0)
i
, for some x0 ∈ [0, x].
By smoothness of U, ∆000 is a continuous function. Thus ∆000 reaches its
maximum on [0, x]. Since
max
©
∆000(x0) : x0 ∈ [0, x]
ª
≥ max
©
∆000(x0) : x0 ∈ [0, y]
ª
, for any y ≤ x,
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there exists ε0 > 0 such that
∆(x) < 0, for all x ∈ (0, ε0).
Thus βk(x) < β(x) for all x ∈ (0, ε0).
Analogously, there is ε00 > 0 such that βk(x) < β(x) for all x ∈ (−ε00, 0).
By choosing ε = min{ε0, ε00}, there is an open ε−ball Bε around 0 such that
Bε∩U¯ ∩ U¯k
0
= {0} for all k0 > k, as desired.
The important implication of this result is that if r does not lie in the
boundary of U , for some (s, r) ∈ F (U), then there are (i) several distinct
reference points in the boundary such that (ii) when U is scaled so that the
induced solution and the reference point inducing the solution correspond
(s, r), then the small-scaled U is contained by U. As a consequence, (ii)
implies by EIIA that (s, r) should also belong to the extended solution under
scaled utilities. By (i) there are many scaled versions of U that has to meet
this property. By EINV and Lemma 4, {s : (s, r) ∈ F (U)} has to contain
many elements. But this violates convexity of the extended solution F . Thus
r has to lie in the boundary of U . This together with Corollary 2 implies
that the four standard axioms alone characterize the extended solution.
Theorem 5 Extended solution F satisfies PAR, EINV, ESYM and EIIA
on eU if and only if F = {(s∗, r∗)}.
Proof. By construction, F ∗ satisfies PAR, EINV, ESYM and EIIA oneU .
To see the other direction, repeat Steps 1-2 of Theorem 1. To check the
third step, note that by ESYM and PAR, (s, r) = (1, ρ1) for ρ ∈ [−1, 1), for
some (s, r) ∈ F (Eh). If ρ = −1, then r ∈ U¯ and Theorem 1 applies. Thus
suppose ρ ∈ (1,−1). Since U ⊆ Eh and (1, ρ1) ∈ U, and since U is strictly
convex, it follows by EIIA that (s, r) = (1, ρ1) for some (s, r) ∈ F (U).
Since ρ1 6∈ U¯ , it follows by Lemma 4 that Q(ρ1) ∩ U¯ is nonempty.
Take any q ∈ Q(ρ1) ∩ U¯ and identify Uq = a(q, ρ1)U + b(q, ρ1). Then, by
construction,
s∗(Uq, ρ1) = s∗(U, ρ1) = 1,
a(q, ρ1)q + b(q, ρ1) = ρ1, and
Uq ⊆ Eh.
By EIIA and convexity of F ,
s = 1, for all (s, r) ∈ F (Uq). (8)
On the other hand, by EINV,
s0 = a(q, ρ1)1+ b(q, ρ1), for all (s0r0) ∈ F (Uq).
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By (3),
s0i =
ρ− s∗i (U, ρ1)
qi − s∗i (U, q)
+
s∗i (U, ρ1)qi − s∗i (U, q)ρ
qi − s∗i (U, q)
(9)
=
qi − 1 + (1− s∗i (U, q))ρ
qi − s∗i (U, q)
.
Combining (8) and (9),
qi − 1 + (1− s∗i (U, q))ρ = qi − s∗i (U, q).
Thus,
s∗(U, q) = 1.
By Lemma 4, Q(ρ1) ∩ U¯ \ {q} is nonempty. Since q was chosen arbitrarily,
s∗(U, q0) = 1 for all q0 ∈ Q(ρ1) ∩ U¯ \ {q}. But this contradicts Lemma 3.
The Main Result But we can say more. Lemma 1 is dependent on
the restriction that any symmetric rectangular problem V induces symmetric
(s, r) ∈ F (V ) such that r ∈ V¯ , and such that 1,−1 ∈ V¯ .We argue that also
this restriction is redundant: it is implied by the other conditions stated in
the theorem. This in turn implies that the four standard axioms characterize
the extended Nash solution even in the general domain. This is the main
result of the paper.
To see why the restriction is redundant, note that Theorem 5 implies that
any extended solution F meeting PAR, EINV, ESYM and EIIA satisfies
F (U) = F ∗(U) for all U ∈ eU . Assume now that r 6∈ V¯ for symmetric
(s, r) ∈ F (V ). Invoke U ∈ eU that on the one hand contains 1 and −1 and,
on the other, is contained by V . For example, small enough Eh would do
(see Fig. 4). Then, by EIIA, (s, r) ∈ F (U). But this is in contradiction with
F (U) = F ∗(U). Thus r ∈ V¯ for symmetric (s, r) ∈ F (V ).
[Figure 4]
Theorem 6 (Main) Extended solution F satisfies PAR, EINV, ESYM,
and EIIA on U if and only if F = F ∗.
Proof. By Lemma 1, it suﬃces to show that PAR, EINV, ESYM, and
EIIA imply that r ∈ V¯ for symmetric (s, r) ∈ F (V ), for all symmetric
rectangular problems V ∈ U . Without loss, assume that boundary of V
contains points 1 and−1 and that its side length is h. ThenEh ⊂ V. Suppose
that r 6= −1 for symmetric (s, r) ∈ V¯ . By EIIA, (s, r) ∈ F (Eh). Since
Eh ∈ eU , Theorem 5 implies that (s0, r0) ∈ F (Eh) only if {(s0, r0)} = F ∗(Eh).
But this implies r = −1, a contradiction
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3 Alternative Interpretation
Admittedly, the interpretation of a reference point is not completely com-
pelling. Why is it that the players are interested in a single reference point
rather than many? To this end we provide an alternative motivation for the
current approach that is based on more reasonable groundings. We argue
that the solution correspondence s∗(U) := {s : (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U)} for U ∈ U ,
can be motivated through many other constructions of of the extended so-
lution concept.
To be more precise, define a generalized solution correspondence G on
U such that G(U) consists of collection of triples (s,G,Â), where G is a
nonsingleton, compact reference set such that G ⊆ U , Â is a complete
and transitive partial order (”collective preference order”) on G, and s
is a solution such that s := maxÂG.9 Since G is nonsingleton, there is
u 6= s such that u ∈ G. Assume that G(U) is convex in a sense that
(s,G,Â) , (s0, G0 Â0) ∈ G(U) imply (sλ+ s0(1− λ), G00,Â00) ∈ G(U) for some
(G00,Â00) such that sλ+ s0(1− λ) = maxÂ00 G00.
The interpretation of G is now that players bargain by eliminating out-
comes from the set of potential decisions, and make the decision once the
remaining set of outcomes, G, can be completely ordered according to some
collective preference criterion Â. Once such stage is reached in the bargain-
ing process, it is easy to pick up the collectively most preferred outcome
s. Hence if one does not want to artificially restrict the extended solution
to contain only two elements, the generalized solution allows a larger set of
reference alternatives.
The generalized versions of the axioms that govern the selection of the
solution correspondence are written as follows.
• Generalized Pareto-optimality : If (s,G,Â) ∈ G(U), then s is Pareto-
optimal.
Pair (G0,Â0) is a transpose of (G,Â) iﬀ G0 := {(u2, u1) : (u1, u2) ∈
G} and (u1, u2) Â (v1, v2) whenever (u2, u1) Â0 (v2, v1), for all u, v ∈ G.
Now (G,Â) is symmetric if and only if it is equal to its transpose. As a
consequence, if (G,Â) is symmetric, then (s,G,Â) is symmetric.
• Generalized Symmetry : If U is a symmetric problem, then G(U) con-
tains a symmetric element.
Note that symmetry of (s,G,Â) implies that G is contained by the di-
agonal (with slope 1) of U. Thus if G contains more than two elements, then
there is u ∈ G \ U¯ .
9Existence of such point is assumed.
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• Generalized Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If (s,G,Â) ∈
G(V ), s, u ∈ G ∩ U for some u 6= s, and U ⊆ V , then (s,G ∩ U,Â) ∈
G(U).
Generalized IIA now reflects the idea that if u is collectively preferred
over v under V, and u, v ∈ U ⊆ V, then u must be collectively preferred over
v under V as long as the preference ordering that is to be constructed leads
to the same choice under U and V. Thus the forces that govern elimination
process under V are also relevant under U ⊆ V, and those parts of G that
can be ranked according to Â under V are also rankable under U as long
as they induce the same optimal choice. Note that the generalized IIA only
binds when (G ∩ U) \ {s} contains an element.
• Generalized Scale Invariance: G is invariant to utility scales.
Note that an extended solution F induces a generalized solution GF such
that
GF (U) := {(s, {s, r},Â) : (s, r) ∈ F (U) and s Â r}, for all U ∈ U .
Thus there is also a natural way to render F ∗ into a generalized solution
GF∗ .
It is important to note that the family of generalized solutions is much
larger than those induced by extended solutions. Nevertheless, it is now
almost routine to check that a generalized solution satisfies the generalized
axioms if and only if it coincides with GF∗ .
The proof of necessity, which is the more diﬃcult part, proceeds as in the
previous section. First use the argument of Lemma 1. Prove that note that
for any appropriately scaled U there is symmetric V that contains U, and
that induces (s,G,Â) where G is, by generalized symmetry, contained by
the positive diagonal of V, and G ⊂ U . Thus by generalized IIA, (s,G,Â) ∈
G(U). Moreover, if there is r 6= s such that r ∈ G ∩ U¯ , then (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U).
To prove that G contains only {s, r} and r ∈ U¯ , for U ∈ eU , assume this is
not the case. Then there is u ∈ G such that u 6∈ U¯ . Replace r with u and
and construct Q(u) as in definition (4). As in Theorem 5, use the argument
of Lemma 4 together with convexity of G(U) to prove that u 6∈ U¯ cannot
be the case. Thus G contains only two elements (but not less since G \ {s}
is nonempty), and both of them lie in the boundary. Then it follows that
(s,G,Â) ∈ G(U) only if G = {s, r} such that (s, r) ∈ F ∗(U), and s Â r.
Finally, use Theorem 6 to prove the same thing in the unrestricted domain.
Now solution F ∗ can be thought as an expression of the generalized
solution that meets the generalized axioms. It is clear that the derivation
of F ∗ already contains the critical arguments needed to characterize GF∗ .
In fact, extended solution F ∗ can be seen as the reduced form expression of
GF∗ that already contains the argument that G = {s, r}.
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Theorem 7 Generalized solution G satisfies the generalized Pareto optimal-
ity, symmetry, IIA and scale invariance axioms if and only if G = GF∗ .
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have argued the standard bargaining framework can be
extended in a natural way to allow axiomatically endogenous formation of
the reference point. We have shown that the extended solution, which deter-
mines endogenously both the solution and the reference point, is uniquely
characterized by the appropriately adjusted Nash-axioms. The result is
surprising since the formation of the disagreement point is completely char-
acterized through the axioms.
As the solution to the current problem is derived as a function of pref-
erences (which are reflected by the utility possibility set) alone, framework
at hand belongs to the realm of social choice. The key diﬀerence to the
standard social choice analysis is the fact that we employ an adjucant ref-
erence point to measure distancies from the solution. These distances are
then used as the primitive to derive the solution. The approach allows us
to circumvent the usual impossibility reults in the social choice literature.
In the light of Conley at.al. (1997, forth.), need for the adjucant refer-
ence point should not be surprising. Indeed they point out that the central
diﬀerence between social choice and bargaining literatures concerns the ex-
istence of a reference or disagreement point from which utility comparisons
can be made. In the former case, the nonexistence of a reference point leads
to impossibility results whereas in latter case the existence of a reference
point allows permissive results. More generally Conley at.al. show that any
scale invariant from which to measure relative utility gains permits one to
use the comparison axioms (such as IIA) and, a fortiori, to derive possi-
bility results. Following Thomson (1981), they also characterize conditions
for reference functions on the domain of utility possibility sets that allow
one to derive unique solution with respect to the defined reference function.
Thus the induced solution is dependent on the axioms that define it, and on
the reference function. Since there are many reference functions, a family of
solutions is induced for any given axiomatization. However, no attempt is
made towards comparing the reference functions. Conley at. al. leave open
the question which are the most desirable properties of a reference function.
The question of moving disagreement point has not gone without recog-
nizion in the literature. In the literature, the approach has typically been
to demand solution to be robust against certain positional changes of the
disagreement point. Such condition can then be used in the characteri-
zation of solutions. Recently, Dagan at. al. (2002) show that IIA can
be replaced with three conditions, independence of non-individually ratio-
nal alternatives (INIR), twisting, which is a monotonicity requirement, and
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disagreement point convexity (DPC) in the characterization of the Nash
solution. Chun and Thomson (1990) replace IIA with INIR, DPC and a
continuity condition. Peters and van Damme (1991) assume INRA, individ-
ual rationality, DPC and a starshaped inverse condition (in the language of
Thomson, 1991). However, this literature does not address the question of
how should the disagreement point be chosen which is the central theme of
this paper. To the authors knowledge, the notion of extended Nash solution
is novel in the literature.
In an interesting contribution, Mariotti (1999) introduces a maximal
symmetry axiom which, in spirit, has connections to our construction. Max-
imal symmetry requires that a solution with relabeled player names should
belong to the original utility space. Marriotti shows that maximal symme-
try and strong individual rationality can be used to replace IIA in the Nash
characterization. Large domain of utility sets is needed. Thus the Nash solu-
tion is characterized through the extended usage of the symmetry properties
of the solution. Extensive use of the symmetry properties of the extended
Nash solution is also the driving factor of our model. This property is more
transparently represented through the axiomatization of Vartiainen (2003),
the old version of this paper.
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